POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY (PQC) / INTERMEDIATE

NIST IR 8547 Is Final: What Changed From The Draft

NIST published the final IR 8547 on 27 October 2026. We compared it with the 2024 draft line by line. Here is what changed, what stayed the same and what it means in practice.

Checked against primary sources and independently reviewed on . Sources are listed at the end.

NIST IR 8547, “Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards”, is NIST’s plan for retiring RSA and elliptic curve cryptography from its standards. The initial public draft appeared on 12 November 2024, with comments invited until 10 January 2025. The final version was published on 27 October 2026, after approval by the NIST Editorial Review Board on 21 October 2026.123

We compared the two PDFs section by section. Where we give our own reading of a change, we say so.

The Headline Change: Every Approved Key Size Is Deprecated After 2030

In the draft’s Tables 2 and 4, RSA, ECDSA, finite field and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman, and MQV at 112 bits of security strength were “Deprecated after 2030” and “Disallowed after 2035”. At 128 bits and above they had a single entry, “Disallowed after 2035”, with no deprecation step. EdDSA appeared only at 128 bits and above, with the same single entry.2

The final uses one row per algorithm family. ECDSA and RSA at 112 bits or more, and EdDSA at 128 bits or more, are all “Deprecated after 2030” and “Disallowed after 2035”. Table 4 does the same for finite field and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman and MQV, and for RSA key establishment.4

The text changed with the tables. Both versions note that SP 800-57 Part 1 had projected disallowing 112-bit public-key schemes on 1 January 2031. The draft said NIST “intends to instead deprecate classical digital signatures at the 112-bit security level”. The final says NIST “will instead deprecate all quantum-vulnerable digital signature algorithms after 2030 and disallow their use under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035”, with matching wording for key establishment.24

Algorithm And StrengthDraftFinal
RSA, ECDSA, DH, ECDH, MQV at 112 bitsDeprecated after 2030; disallowed after 2035Deprecated after 2030; disallowed after 2035
RSA, ECDSA, DH, ECDH, MQV at 128 bits or moreDisallowed after 2035 (no deprecation step)Deprecated after 2030; disallowed after 2035
EdDSA at 128 bits or moreDisallowed after 2035 (no deprecation step)Deprecated after 2030; disallowed after 2035
Transition status of quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms in NIST IR 8547, draft (November 2024) and final (October 2026). Source: Tables 2 and 4 of each version.
  1. Upcoming

    United States · National Institute of Standards and Technology Guidance

    Quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, finite field and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman, MQV) become deprecated under NIST standards and guidelines, at every key size currently approved.

    NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (final, 27 October 2026). Applies to systems following NIST standards, including US federal systems. Source · Explainer · Verified 7 Nov 2026

  2. Upcoming

    United States · National Institute of Standards and Technology Guidance

    Quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms become disallowed under NIST standards and guidelines.

    NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (final, 27 October 2026). Applies to systems following NIST standards, including US federal systems. Source · Explainer · Verified 7 Nov 2026

Countdowns run to the end of each deadline date (UTC) and are calculated in your browser. "Binding" means legally or contractually required; other labels describe supervisory expectations, guidance, drafts or announcements. Always check the source for the current text.

What Deprecated And Disallowed Mean

Both terms come from SP 800-131A, NIST’s guidance on transitioning cryptographic algorithms and key lengths. IR 8547 quotes the definitions in section 4.1, unchanged from the draft:24

  • Deprecated: the algorithm and key length or strength “may be used, but there is some security risk. The data owner must examine this risk potential and decide whether to continue to use a deprecated algorithm or key length.”
  • Disallowed: the algorithm, key length or strength, parameter set or scheme “is no longer allowed for the stated purpose”.
  • Legacy use: the algorithm, scheme or parameter set “may only be used to process already protected information (e.g., to decrypt ciphertext data or to verify a digital signature)”.

The glossary ties deprecated and disallowed to applying cryptographic protection.5 Tables 2 and 4 give quantum-vulnerable algorithms no legacy use period.4

In our reading, the practical effect of the headline change falls on risk decisions rather than on engineering. Under the draft, RSA and ECDSA parameter sets providing 128 bits of classical security had no deprecation step before their 2035 disallowance. Under the final, their use to apply cryptographic protection is deprecated after 2030 (approved hybrid combinations are treated separately), and NIST’s definition places the decision to continue, and the risk, with the data owner.

What Stayed The Same

  • The milestones: deprecation after 2030 and disallowance after 2035.24
  • The post-quantum signatures: ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and LMS and XMSS with their multi-tree variants, with the same parameter sets and nominal security categories, apart from a new note on ML-DSA-44 covered below.24
  • ML-KEM as the only approved post-quantum key establishment scheme for now.24
  • Symmetric cryptography: no transition expected for primitives at 128 bits or more, while NIST’s few 112-bit symmetric standards “will be disallowed in 2030”.234
  • Application-specific standards may require earlier moves, with priority for post-quantum key establishment in TLS and IKE.26

What Is New In The Final Report

Alignment With EO 14412 And OMB M-26-15

Much of the new text ties the report to two documents issued in June 2026: Executive Order 14412 (“Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks”, 22 June 2026) and OMB Memorandum M-26-15 (“Execution of the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography”, 24 June 2026). The abstract now says the report supports their implementation.378

The final restates the federal dates: high value assets and high impact systems must adopt post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030 and signatures by 31 December 2031, with the same priority for other highly sensitive systems. It also notes the duty to support TLS 1.3 by 2 January 2030.4

It then says how the two sets of dates fit together. The 2030 to 2035 window “accommodates lower-risk systems and applications with legacy constraints while full migration concludes”, and “this window does not alter the earlier deadlines” for high value assets, high impact systems and other high-sensitivity federal systems.4 The National Security Memorandum 10 goal of completing the federal migration by 2035 “remains in place”. Systems that cannot support post-quantum cryptography “should be identified and prioritized for replacement or decommissioning”.4

  1. Upcoming

    United States · The White House Binding

    Agencies must support TLS 1.3 or a successor version as soon as practicable, and no later than this date, under requirements that the order directed OMB (for other systems) and NSA (for national security systems) to issue; OMB M-26-15 restates the date.

    Executive Order 14306 (6 June 2025), amending Executive Order 14144, section 4(f). Applies to US federal agencies, through OMB requirements for other systems and NSA requirements for national security systems. Source · Explainer · Verified 7 Nov 2026

  2. Upcoming

    United States · The White House and Office of Management and Budget Binding

    OMB guidance issued under the order must require agencies to move all high value assets and high impact systems to post-quantum key establishment by this date. M-26-15 plans this as its 2028 to 2030 migration phase.

    Executive Order 14412, Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks (22 June 2026), section 4(b)(ii), through OMB guidance including Memorandum M-26-15. Applies to US federal agencies (national security systems excluded). Source · Explainer · Verified 7 Nov 2026

  3. Upcoming

    United States · The White House and Office of Management and Budget Binding

    OMB guidance issued under the order must require agencies to move all high value assets and high impact systems to post-quantum digital signatures by this date. M-26-15 plans this as its 2031 migration phase.

    Executive Order 14412, Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks (22 June 2026), section 4(b)(iii), through OMB guidance including Memorandum M-26-15. Applies to US federal agencies (national security systems excluded). Source · Explainer · Verified 7 Nov 2026

Countdowns run to the end of each deadline date (UTC) and are calculated in your browser. "Binding" means legally or contractually required; other labels describe supervisory expectations, guidance, drafts or announcements. Always check the source for the current text.

Key Establishment Detail

  • ML-KEM-768 as the default. The final says “NIST recommends using ML-KEM-768 as the default parameter set”. The draft had no default recommendation.42
  • HQC named. The draft said NIST expected to select “one or more alternatives to ML-KEM”. The final says HQC was selected, its FIPS is under development, and it will be approved once published.34
  • No further quantum-vulnerable standards. For both signatures and key establishment, NIST “does not anticipate standardizing” any further algorithms that are not quantum-resistant.4

Hybrid Key Establishment

Both versions say NIST will update SP 800-56C so its generic composite technique can take a shared secret from FIPS 203 or any future NIST key establishment standard. The final adds two points:29

  • The technique is allowed “even if T is derived from an unapproved source (including a disallowed algorithm)”, and section 4.1.2 adds that such a combination “can be FIPS 140-validated, even if other inputs are disallowed”, provided at least one input comes from an approved scheme.94
  • SP 800-56C will allow the two shared secrets to be concatenated in either order, Z‖T or T‖Z, with the order “specified at the protocol level”.9

The final also cites SP 800-227 on key combiners as published, where the draft called it forthcoming.92

TLS, PIV And Validation

Section 4.2 now calls TLS “an early priority for the migration” and says guidance on quantum-resistant key establishment in TLS, including hybrids of ML-KEM with classical algorithms, “will be reflected in the next revision of SP 800-52”. It adds that PIV credentials, readers and the supporting PKI must begin updating early because of multi-year replacement cycles.6 Section 3 adds that NIST is revising Cryptographic Module Validation Program processes to speed up validation of post-quantum modules, as EO 14412 directs.3

Smaller Changes

  • ML-DSA-44. A new note to Table 3 says its security category “is reduced to category 1 if an approved RBG with less than 192 bits of security is used”.4
  • Ascon. The symmetric tables now include Ascon (SP 800-232).4
  • SHA-1. A new note says SHA-1 is deprecated “for all remaining technical applications” and will be disallowed in FIPS-validated modules after 2030.4
  • Authentication. The draft said that once a capable quantum computer exists, authentication with quantum-vulnerable algorithms “will need to be disabled”. The final says it “will need to immediately transition to the use of quantum-resistant algorithms”.32

Who It Applies To

IR 8547 is guidance, and its direct weight comes through US federal policy. M-26-15 says agencies “must align their plans with NIST Internal Report (IR) 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, or successor document”. M-26-15 does not apply to national security systems.8 Their CNSA 2.0 dates are covered in The Post-Quantum Standards Timeline.

Outside government, NIST’s announcement says that while the federal requirements apply to federal systems, “many organizations that work with the federal government will be affected as well”.10 The report itself describes its framework as a “blueprint for critical infrastructure owners and operators and other organizations undergoing the same shift”.3 For other countries’ dates, see Official Migration Timelines.

What This Means For An Organisation

This is our practical reading of the report, not additional requirements.

Start with the inventory. The introduction says organisations “should treat the migration to PQC as a current operational priority, beginning with cryptographic inventories, migration planning, and early deployments of PQC-enabled products and services”.3 Every RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, Diffie-Hellman or MQV entry in it is deprecated after 2030.4 See What A Cryptographic Inventory Should Contain.

Put key establishment for long-lived data first. The report ties the urgency of key establishment to harvest now, decrypt later attacks, while calling signatures urgent too because their transition takes longer.36 See Prioritising What To Migrate First.

Flag what cannot be upgraded. The report asks for systems that cannot support post-quantum cryptography to be identified for replacement or decommissioning, and for devices whose signature verification code cannot be updated after manufacture to be designed from the start to require quantum-resistant signatures if they may still be in use when a capable quantum computer arrives.34

Treat 2035 as the outer limit. For federal high value and high impact systems the dates are 2030 and 2031, and NIST says its window does not change them.4 See US federal policy.

Watch the follow-on documents. The detail will come in revisions of SP 800-131A, SP 800-56C and SP 800-52, and in the HQC FIPS.496 For hybrid design, see Hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptography.

Footnotes

  1. NIST Computer Security Resource Center, “IR 8547: Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards”, document history, checked 7 November 2026. csrc.nist.gov ↩

  2. NIST, IR 8547 initial public draft, “Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards”, November 2024, sections 1 to 4. nvlpubs.nist.gov ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13

  3. NIST, IR 8547, “Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards”, final, October 2026, publication history, abstract and sections 1 to 3. nvlpubs.nist.gov ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10

  4. NIST, IR 8547, “Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards”, final, October 2026, section 4 and section 4.1, Tables 2 to 8, and the SP 800-131A reference note. nvlpubs.nist.gov ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23

  5. NIST, IR 8547, “Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards”, final, October 2026, Appendix A (Glossary). nvlpubs.nist.gov ↩

  6. NIST, IR 8547, “Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards”, final, October 2026, section 4.2. nvlpubs.nist.gov ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  7. The White House, Executive Order 14412, “Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks”, 22 June 2026, sections 4(b) and 6(b). govinfo.gov ↩

  8. Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum M-26-15, “Execution of the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography”, 24 June 2026, sections 1 and 3 and Appendix A. whitehouse.gov ↩ ↩2

  9. NIST, IR 8547, “Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards”, final, October 2026, sections 3.2 and 3.2.1. nvlpubs.nist.gov ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  10. NIST, “NIST Report Provides Guidelines for Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards”, 27 October 2026. nist.gov ↩

Knowledge Hub content is general information. It is not legal advice, a compliance certification, a guarantee of security or a substitute for an assessment of your own systems. Standards and rules change; check the sources for the latest position.