The Locks Of The Internet: What Public-Key Cryptography Does
Public-key cryptography lets strangers agree on secrets and prove who they are. Here is how it works, where you rely on it, and which parts a quantum computer would threaten.
Why a large quantum computer would break the public-key cryptography the internet relies on, and when that could matter.
Public-key cryptography lets strangers agree on secrets and prove who they are. Here is how it works, where you rely on it, and which parts a quantum computer would threaten.
Two quantum algorithms drive the threat to cryptography. One breaks today's public-key algorithms outright; the other only weakens symmetric ciphers and hashes. Here is the difference and why it matters.
Attackers can copy encrypted data today and wait for a quantum computer to read it. Here is how the threat works, what it does and does not affect, and how to judge whether your data is exposed.
Nobody knows when a quantum computer will break today's encryption. Mosca's inequality turns that uncertainty into a planning test based on data shelf life and migration time.
Six common beliefs about quantum computers and encryption, checked against what NIST, the UK NCSC and European security agencies actually say.
A short guide to the main US and UK post-quantum milestones, which are binding and which are guidance, and where to find the full regional detail.
How Shor's algorithm turns factoring into a search for a repeating pattern, which part needs a quantum computer, and why error correction rather than the algorithm is the real obstacle.
Published estimates of the quantum computer needed to break RSA-2048 have fallen from about a billion physical qubits in 2012 to under 100,000 in 2026. Here is each step and the assumptions behind it.
Estimates published in 2026 suggest 256-bit elliptic curve keys need fewer quantum resources to break than RSA-2048. Here is what the papers claim, what they assume and which points are contested.